Following the panel
discussion on voter engagement of young people
at Ryerson University recently backbench Liberal MPP Arthur Potts
proposes that the voting age should be lowered two years, to 16.
Scotland and Argentina are among the places where teenagers are
allowed to cast ballots at that age, a time when many are taking on
other responsibilities such as getting behind the wheel of a car,.
“They can drive. They can work,” “This proposal is not a
stretch from where we are today.” he said.
“I think they’re quite capable of making a reasoned choice for
a political party,” he added, noting two high schools in his riding
already hold mock elections to mirror real-world elections. “I
can’t imagine a downside.”
Its hard to substantially disagree with him given that most of our
youth are much more “connected” than us older folks were at that
age and that its much easier nowadays to keep abreast of the various
'platforms'. This is not to say that there will be youth who will
have no clue about the choices presented or wont care, but then that
is no less true of many 'adults' where the traditional low turnout
say much about our collective apathy around voting.
It is gradually getting better with a 50% turnout in the last
Ontario election and an unprecedented near 70% 2015 federal election,
whilst much of the uptick may have to do with the choices put before
us and the quality of said candidates the inclusion of more youth may
liven things up a little. Our younger voters will be much more
comfortable with online voting than some us 'old fogies' but even
this 70+ fellow uses online banking so it should be that much of a
stretch to include online voting as a alternative to paper balloting.
According
to the 2011 Elections Canada Survey of Electors,
a majority of non-voters (57 percent), primarily those with
Internet access at home, said they would have voted had it been
possible to do so over the Internet using the Elections Canada
website. The proportion was 10 percentage points higher among
18-to-24-year-olds. Of interest, the likelihood of non-voters saying
that they would have voted online was higher among users of Facebook
and similar applications.
The Study sheds additional light on electors' attitudes about
Internet voting. Just under half of electors (49.1 percent) agree,
somewhat (31.5 percent) or strongly (17.6 percent), that "Canadians
should have the option to vote over the Internet in federal
elections". This compares to 39.4 percent who disagree. A
majority of electors said they would be likely to vote over the
Internet if they could do so but 50.3 percent of them think voting
over the Internet is "risky" while only 29.7 percent think
it is not. I suspect that these figures have changed considerably
since 2011.
Ontario has e Registration,
where you can confirm, update or add your information to the Voters
List “in just a few easy steps”. I have not tried that yet so
cant verify how 'easy' it is but I do hope it is an improvement over
some of the previous efforts in that regard, you will not however be
able to vote electronically in any provincial or federal
election that I know of.
Elections
Canada has a long, and I do mean a loooong,
discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of moving towards a
modernised voting system that includes electronic voting but it looks
to be far distant dream at this point. What follows is a few clips
from that document which seems to me to be mostly about why we cannot
adopt such a system.
First, proponents cite convenience
and the principle of voting at any time as a primary
advantage. Research of online voters in municipal elections in Canada
confirms that convenience is the leading reason for using the voting
method, with 66% of those surveyed in the 2014 Ontario municipal
elections noting that is why they voted online
(Finally) claims of youth
engagement are often made since presumably young
people are more technically inclined than previous cohorts of
electors and are avid users of the internet. Studies find, however,
that young or first time voters are more likely to vote by paper than
online
Overall benefits such as
convenience, access, greater voter privacy and reduction in spoiled
ballots are well established. Modest improvements in turnout are also
documented in a Canadian context, albeit for municipal elections, as
well as the attraction of some non-voters to the voting method.
Opposition to online voting, or
hesitancy to pursue it, is based on several principal barriers., they
include....
The digital divide
refers to having access to an internet connection, the quality of
that connection and digital skills and knowledge. If an elector does
not have access to the internet, or a poor quality/ slow connection,
it is argued they will be less likely to vote online. …...it
remains an issue in some more rural places in Canada, notably in
northern areas and Indigenous communities........
Ballot secrecy is one of the top
barriers to online voting implementation ….....any voting or
counting process that does not adhere to the principle of ballot
secrecy “cannot be considered democratic”
Authentication
is another barrier that must be sufficiently overcome to adopt online
voting. It refers to the process of confirming voters are who they
say they are. The Auditability of
voting must be maintained with online voting (can the votes as
recorded be confirmed to be correct).
A list of common security threats
associated with online voting systems that are not present in
traditional paper voting at the polls where ballots are counted by
hand is shown in a table included in the article and summerised
here....Vote
Selling and Coercion , Phishing , Automation bias , Denial of Service
, Client-side Malware/Spyware , Server penetrations , Insider
Influence , State-level Actors
Finally
Overall technical barriers such as
authentication, verification, ballot secrecy and auditability need to
be managed based on available technology and contextual
circumstances, threats to security present additional challenges. In
practice, the two principles of being able to verify votes are cast
as intended and tallied as cast take place in three phases or steps
whereby voters can check that their ballot was cast an intended,
recorded as cast and tallied as cast:
1. Cast as intended
– at the time of voting, voters are provided with evidence, often
in the form or a receipt or code, that their encrypted ballot
reflects their voting choice.
2. Recorded as cast
– voters can check that the encrypted ballot has been included
correctly by seeing the encrypted code they cast on a public list,
which shows the encrypted votes that have been cast.
3. Tallied as recorded
– “any member of the public can check that all the published
encrypted votes are correctly included in the tally, without knowing
how any individual voted”.
There is the potential to make our voting system much easier and
to encourage greater participation via electronic voting however the
recent rushed disaster in attempting to use such a system to select a
new Ontario Conservative leader has not improved the chances of using
such for provincial or federal voting anytime soon!